No Winners Here: Why Every “Fair” Crypto Auction Ends Up Trivial Post date October 22, 2025 Post author By EScholar: Electronic Academic Papers for Scholars Post categories In auction-theory, blockchain-research, collusion-resistance, crypto-economics, game-theory, incentive-compatibility, mechanism-design, transaction-fee-mechanisms
Foundational Models for DSIC, MMIC, and OCA‑Proof Cryptoeconomic Mechanisms Post date October 21, 2025 Post author By EScholar: Electronic Academic Papers for Scholars Post categories In auction-theory, blockchain-economics, collusion-resistance, crypto-protocol-design, game-theory, incentive-compatibility, mechanism-design, transaction-fee-mechanisms
When Every Mechanism Burns: The Theoretical Boundaries of DSIC, MMIC, and OCA-Proof Design Post date October 21, 2025 Post author By EScholar: Electronic Academic Papers for Scholars Post categories In auction-theory, blockchain-economics, crypto-mechanism, cryptocurrency-incentives, game-theory, incentive-compatibility, mechanism-design, transaction-fee-mechanisms
The Limits of Incentive-Compatible and OCA-Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms in Cryptocurrencies Post date October 21, 2025 Post author By EScholar: Electronic Academic Papers for Scholars Post categories In auction-theory, blockchain-incentives, cryptocurrency-economics, data-integrity, game-theory, incentive-compatibility, mechanism-designs, transaction-fee-mechanisms
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