When Every Mechanism Burns Out: The Final Word on Blockchain Collusion Resistance Post date October 22, 2025 Post author By EScholar: Electronic Academic Papers for Scholars Post categories In auction-mechanisms, blockchain-theory, collusion-resistance, crypto-economics, ethereum-research, game-theory, incentive-design, mechanism-design
No Winners Here: Why Every “Fair” Crypto Auction Ends Up Trivial Post date October 22, 2025 Post author By EScholar: Electronic Academic Papers for Scholars Post categories In auction-theory, blockchain-research, collusion-resistance, crypto-economics, game-theory, incentive-compatibility, mechanism-design, transaction-fee-mechanisms
Comparing SCP and OCA in Transaction Fee Mechanisms: Core Differences and Results Post date October 21, 2025 Post author By EScholar: Electronic Academic Papers for Scholars Post categories In algorithmic-economics, auction-theory, blockchain-economics, collusion-resistance, crypto-incentives, game-theory, mechanism-design, transaction-fee-mechanisms
Foundational Models for DSIC, MMIC, and OCA‑Proof Cryptoeconomic Mechanisms Post date October 21, 2025 Post author By EScholar: Electronic Academic Papers for Scholars Post categories In auction-theory, blockchain-economics, collusion-resistance, crypto-protocol-design, game-theory, incentive-compatibility, mechanism-design, transaction-fee-mechanisms
The Research Roots of Collusion‑Resistant Crypto Auctions Post date October 21, 2025 Post author By EScholar: Electronic Academic Papers for Scholars Post categories In algorithmic-economics, auction-theory, blockchain-research, collusion-resistance, crypto-incentives, game-theory, mechanism-design, transaction-fee-mechanism
When Every Mechanism Burns: The Theoretical Boundaries of DSIC, MMIC, and OCA-Proof Design Post date October 21, 2025 Post author By EScholar: Electronic Academic Papers for Scholars Post categories In auction-theory, blockchain-economics, crypto-mechanism, cryptocurrency-incentives, game-theory, incentive-compatibility, mechanism-design, transaction-fee-mechanisms
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